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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
LABOR LAW-COLLECTIVE BARGAINING-The Retire-
ment Benefits of Retired Employees Are a 
Mandatory Subject of Bargaining Because 
Retirees Are "Employees" Under the 
NLRA and Because Active Employees 
Have an Interest in Such Benefits-
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company, 
Chemical Division* 
It is well established that employee pension plans1 and health 
insurance programs2 are mandatory collective bargaining topics 
under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA).3 However, the 
NLRA requires such bargaining by an employer only with respect 
to his own employees;4 no such duty is imposed in situations in 
which the union demanding the bargaining rights is doing so other 
than as a representative of "his [the employer's] employees" within 
the meaning of the Act.5 Recently, in Pittsburgh Plate Glass Com-
pany, Chemical Division,6 the National Labor Relations Board 
interpreted the meaning of "his employees" in a case in which a 
union demanded that the employer bargain about the benefits of 
former employees who had retired. 
• 1'17 N.L.R.B. No. 114, 71 L.R.R.M. 1433 (1969), appeal docketed, No. 19,875, 6th 
Cir., Sept. 23, 1969. · 
I. Inland Steel Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1, enforced, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. 
denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949). 
2. W.W. Cross & Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1162 (1948), enforced, 174 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 
1949). 
3. National Labor Relations Act § S(d), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964) [hereinafter 
NLRA], states in part that 
to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the em-
ployer and the representative of the employees to .•. confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the 
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder . . . . 
See also Note, Pension and Retirement Matters-A Subject of Compulsory Collective 
Bargaining, 43 ILL. L. REV. 713 (1948). , 
4. NLRA § 8(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964) (emphasis added), makes it an 
unfair labor practice for an employer "to refuse to bargain collectively with the 
representatives of his employees •.• ," concerning those topics which fall within the 
area of "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." 
5. NLRA § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1964) (emphasis added), states in part that 
"[t]he term 'employee' shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the 
employees of a particular employer, unless the Act explicitly states otherwise •.. " 
As has already been shown in note 4 supra, § 8(a)(5) e.xplicitly limits the use of the 
term "employee" with respect to an employer's obligation to bargain collectively to 
cover only that employer's own employees. 
6. 177 N.L.R.B. No. 114, 71 L.R.R.M. 1433 (1969), appeal docketed, No. 19,875, 
6th Cir., Sept. 23, 1969. This was the first case in the thirty-four-year history of the 
NLRA in which the Board faced the question of the status of retired workers for 
collective-bargaining purposes under the Act. 177 N.L.R.B. No. 114, at 5, 71 L.R.R.M. 
at 1435. • 
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Since 1949, the union7 had been the exclusive bargaining repre-
sentative of the hourly rated workers of the employer.8 Among the 
terms of the contract negotiated by the parties in 1964 was a pro-
vision continuing a previously established health insurance program 
which covered both active and retired employees. Under the plan, 
retirees were required to pay a part of the premiums for their cov-
erage, and the employer paid the remainder. Following the adoption 
of the Medicare program in 1965,9 the union sought mid-term con-
tract negotiations concerning those provisions of the health insur-
ance program which had been supplanted by the new Medicare 
coverage.10 The employer rejected the union's request and chal-
lenged its right to bargain for retirees on the ground that they were 
not "his employees" within the meaning of the NLRA.11 The com-
pany subsequently announced its intention to make a unilateral 
modification of the existing plan in order to provide coverage which 
would supplement Medicare. On account of union objections, how-
ever, the employer did not implement its announced plan, but 
instead offered retirees, on an individual basis, the option of adopt-
ing the proposed supplemental coverage in lieu of their present 
plan. Thereupon, the union filed an unfair labor practice charge 
with the NLRB, claiming that the employer's action constituted 
a refusal to bargain about a mandatory subject of collective bar-
gaining in violation of section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA.12 ·while rec-
ognizing the established precedent that employee health insurance 
plans are mandatory subjects of collective bargaining under the 
NLRA,13 the trial examiner concluded that there had been no vi-
olation by the employer because 
pensioners and retirees are not employees as defined by Section 2(3) 
of the Ac~ ... and, therefore, are not employees within the meaning 
7. The union in the instant case was Local 1, Allied Chemical and Alkali Workers 
of America. 
8. The employer in the case was the Barberton, Ohio, Plant of the Pittsburgh 
Plate Glass Company, Chemical Division. 
9. Act of July 30, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 290. 
10. For discussions of the effects of Medicare on collective bargaining contracts, see 
Foust, Effect of Medicare on Privately Bargained Plans, N.Y.U. 19TH CONF. ON LAn. 
273 (1966); Developments in Industrial Relations, 89 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 420 (1966); 
Medicare and Negotiated Health Insurance for Workers, 88 MONTHLY LAB. REv., 
Sept. 1965, at iii. 
11. During the 1959 negotiations, the employer had similarly challenged the right 
of the union to require it to bargain about health insurance benefits for retired 
workers, but it finally agreed to do so and continued to bargain with the union 
concerning such benefits in subsequent negotiations. 
12. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964); see note 4 supra. 
13. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., Chemical Div., TXD-196-67, at 5 (April 14, 1967) 
(Constantine, Trial Examiner). For the differentiation of the three major types of 
collective bargaining topics-mandatory, permissive, and illegal-regulated by the 
NLRA, see NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-W:arner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). 
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of Section 8(a)(5) .... Therefore, their pensions and other benefits 
received as retirees and pensioners are not . . . mandatory subjects 
of collective bargaining, and [the employer] is not under a statutory 
onus to bargain thereon.14 
The Board, however, disagreed. Before reaching the question 
whether retiree benefits are a mandatory subject of collective bar-
gaining under the Act, it held that the employer, by unilaterally 
modifying the terms of the collective bargaining contract which was 
in effect, had violated section 8(a)(5).15 This ground, by itself, is 
sufficient to support the Board's decision in Pittsburgh Plate Glass.16 
However, the Board also concluded "that retired employees' 
retirement benefits are embraced by the bargaining obligation of 
Section 8(a)(5)"17 because they are a mandatory subject of bargain-
ing. The Board enunciated three grounds for this conclusion: 
First, that retired employees are "employees" within the meaning 
of the statute for the purposes of bargaining about changes in their 
retirement benefits; second, that bargaining about changes in retire-
ment benefits for retired employees is in any event within the con-
templation of the statute because of the interest which active em-
ployees have in the subject; and, third, that bargaining about such 
benefits is fully consonant with the statutory requirement that 
"wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment" be 
subject to the institution of collective bargaining envisioned by the 
Act.18 
This Recent Development will examine the substance and im-
plications of the latter aspect of Pittsburgh Plate Glass, although 
it is only dictum in the case. The third ground of the Board's con-
clusion regarding retirement benefits was really only a general 
14. TXD-196-67, at 6. 
15. 177 N.L.R.B. No. 114, at 20, 71 L.R.R.M. at 1440-41. The Board also found a 
derivative violation of § 8(a)(l), which generally forbids employer interference with 
the rights of employees to organize and bargain collectively. 
16. Section 8(d) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964), defines the § 8(a)(5) 
duty to bargain collectively. In additon to requiring bargaining about mandatory sub-
jects (wages, hours, and working conditions), it requires bargaining about any question 
arising under a negotiated agreement, and it prohibits the unilateral termination 
or modification of an effective collective bargaining contract without compliance with 
the terms of that section. Thus, the Board's conclusion that the employer's unilateral 
modification of the medical plan for retired employees violated § 8(a)(5) appears to be 
sound. See C &: S Indus., 158 N.L.R.B. 454, 457-58 (1966). That the employer's action 
might also have given rise to arbitration proceedings or an action for contract enforce-
ment does not deprive the Board of jurisdiction to remedy the unfair labor practice. 
NLRB v. Huttig Sash &: Door Co., 377 F.2d 764 (8th Cir. 1967). See generally Note, 
Labor Law-Jurisdiction-Contractual Interpretation, Unfair Labor Practices, and 
Arbitration: A Proposed Resolution of Jurisdictional Overlap, 68 MICH. L. REv. 141 
(1969). 
17. 177 N.L.R.B. No. 114, at 11, 71 L.R.R.M. at 1438. 
18. 177 N.L.R.B. No. 114, at 5, 71 L.R.R.M. at 1435. 
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reiteration of the first two. It is therefore apparent that that ground 
is dependent upon the validity of either or both of the other two 
bases of the Board's conclusion. 
Since the second ground appears to be the weaker of the two, 
it will be examined and disposed of before attention is focused on 
the first. In concluding that the retirement benefits of retired em-
ployees is a mandatory topic of collective bargaining between an 
employer and the representative of currently active employees, the 
Board emphasized the personal interest of active employees in the 
subject. The right of active employees to bargain about the retire-
ment benefits which will affect them directly in the future is beyond 
question.19 However, the retirement benefits at issue in Pittsburgh 
Plate Glass were of a different nature; those benefits were being 
enjoyed by former employees who had already retired at the time of 
the dispute. Active employees cannot be said to have the same direct, 
personal interest in benefits of that nature. Consequently, it is con-
siderably more difficult to bring such benefits within the scope of 
section 8(d) as "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of 
employment"20 with respect to the active employees. 
In attempting to bring the retiree benefits within that definition, 
the Board noted that changes in retirees' benefits affect the amount 
of money available for active employees, thus placing retirees in 
competition with the active employees.21 Arguably, this consider-
ation is similar to the one presented in Local 24, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Oliver,22 in which the competition 
was between drivers who belonged to the Teamsters Union and 
who worked for the various employers involved, and the indepen-
dent "gypsy" drivers, who owned their own tractors which they 
"leased" to the same employers. To limit the competitive effect 
of the independent owner-drivers, the Teamsters Union negotiated 
with the employers an agreement regulating the minimum rates 
which could be paid to that group. In response, the o·wner-drivers 
brought a suit under the applicable state antitrust law. The Su-
preme Court held that the regulation of the owner-drivers' "leasing" 
rates was a mandatory subject for collective bargaining, and that 
hence state antitrust regulation was pre-empted by federal labor 
legislation.23 The Court noted~that such "regulations embody ... 
19. See Inland 'steel Co., 'l'l N .L.R.B. 1, enforced, 170 F.2d 247 ('lth Cir. 1948), 
cert. denied, 336 U.S. 960 (1949). 
20. See note 2 supra. 
21. l'l'l N.L.R.B. No. 114, at 14, 'll L.R.R.M. at 1438. 
22, 358 U.S. 283 (1959). 
23. 358 U.S. at 293-95. The basic standard for the doctrine of pre-emption was 
established in San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959), in 
which the Court stated: "When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the 
[NLRA], the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive com-
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a direct frontal attack upon a problem thought to threaten the 
maintenance of the basic wage structure established by the collective 
bargaining contract,"24' and recognized that such an agreement is 
so directly related to "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions 
of employment," that it is covered by section 8(d) of the NLRA.25 
Although applying the Oliver reasoning to the competition be-
tween retirees and active employees may seem to support the Board's 
position in Pittsburgh Plate Glass, the retiree competition is dis-
tinguishable. As the Court noted in Oliver, the threat of the owner-
drivers to the union drivers was very direct, for lower "leasing" 
rates paid to the owner-drivers could have undermined the union 
wage scale or caused union drivers to be displaced. But a severe 
and direct threat is not present with respect to the benefits paid to 
retired workers. Increases in those benefits are unlikely to have such 
pervasive effects on the wage rates of active employees, and there 
is no threat at all that active employees would be displaced by re-
tirees. It is therefore submitted that retirement benefits of retirees 
are not related to the wages, hours, and working conditions of active 
employees to such a degree as to require an employer, simply be-
cause of the subject matter, to bargain about them with the repre-
sentative of the active employees. 
The Board also noted the active employees' personal interest 
in seeing that the employer honors his obligations under retirement 
benefit programs-that is, that the employer neither breaches his 
contractual obligations nor unilaterally modifies them. But this 
concern can be accommodated without trying to raise the interest 
of active employees in retiree benefits to the level necessary to bring 
them within the scope of mandatory subjects of bargaining with 
respect to active employees. An action under section 301 of the La-
bor Management Relations Act (LMRA)26 is available to remedy 
breaches of collective bargaining agreements; and section 8(a)(5), 
as the Board recognized in Pittsburgh Plate Glass, affords protection 
against unilateral modifications of collective bargaining contracts.27 
Since the Board's conclusion that retiree benefits are a manda-
tory subject of bargaining with respect to active employees is dif-
ficult to sustain, the real basis for the decision that retiree benefits 
are a mandatory subject of bargaining must be its conclusion that 
"retired employees are 'employees' within the meaning of the statute 
for the purposes of bargaining about changes in their retirement 
pctence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with 
national policy is to be averted." 359 U.S. at 245. 
24. 358 U.S. at 294. 
25. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1964). For the Court's discussion, see 358 U.S. at 294-95. 
26. 29 u.s.c. § 185 (1964). 
Zl, See notes 15-16 supra and accompanying text. 
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benefits .... "28 The Board reached this conclusion despite the fact 
that it has consistently ruled that retired workers are not "employees" 
under the NLRA for the purposes of voting in representation elec-
tions. 29 The Board said that its earlier decisions applied only to 
the narrow issue of voting eligibility,30 and noted that decisions 
had often considered persons who were not presently working for 
the employer in question to be "employees" within the meaning 
of the NLRA: "[T]he Board has held that applicants for employ-
ment and registrants at hiring halls-who have never been hired 
in the first place-as well as persons who have quit or whose em-
ployers have gone out of business are 'employees' embraced by the 
policies of the Act."31 The Board also emphasized that a pensioner's 
"retirement status . . . is the culmination and the product of years 
of employment" and stated that such an individual has "deep legal, 
economic, and emotional attachments to a bargaining unit which 
28. 177 N.L.R.B. No. 114, at 5, 71 L.R.R.M. at 1435. 
29. Public Serv. Corp. of N.J., 72 N.L.R.B. 224 (1947). It is interesting to note that 
in that case, the Board noted that "[w]e have considerable doubt as to whether or not 
pensioners are employees within the meaning of Section 2(3) of the Act, since they no 
longer perform any work for the Employers, and have little expectancy of resuming 
their former employment." 72 N.L.R.B. at 299-30. Furthermore, in Illinois Knitting Co., 
11 N.L.R.B. 48 (1939), the Board rejected the argument that the retired person in 
question should have voting rights because he might possibly return to work at some 
future date. In rejecting that contention, the Board stated that it did not believe that 
"the bare prospect of future employment ••• is sufficient to make [the retiree an 
'employee' for voting purposes) within the meaning of the Act." 11 N.L.R.B. at 53. In 
another representation case, Whiting Corp. v. NLRB, 200 F.2d 43 (7th Cir, 1952), the 
court noted: 
It seems well established by the Board's own decisions, The Massilon Aluminum 
Company, 27 N.L.R.B. 165; Western Union Telegraph Co., 32 N.L.R.B. 210, at 215; 
Van Brunt Mfg. Co., 45 N.L.R.B. 634, at 636; W. D. Byrin &: Sons of Md., Inc., 
55 N.L.R.B. 172, at 174, that whether one is an employee is a question to be 
determined by his reasonable expectation of employment within a reasonable 
time in the future. 
200 F.2d at 45. See also NLRB v. Atkinson Dredging Co., 329 F.2d 158 (4th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 965 (1964), in which the court applied the same standard. 
30. 177 N.L.R.B. No. 114, at 7, 71 L.R.R.M. at 1436. 
31. 177 N.L.R.B. No. 114, at 8, 71 L.R.R.M. at 1436 (citations omitted). It should 
be noted, however, that, except for Chemrock Corp., 151 N.L.R.B. 1074, 1076-79 
(1965), the cases cited by the Board all involved general unfair labor practices and 
did not have any direct relevance to the narrower issue of who constitutes an "em-
ployee" for bargaining purposes under the NLRA. See Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 
313 U.S. 177, 182-87 (1941); Local 872, Intl. Longshoremen's Assn., 163 N.L.R.B. No. 
69 (1967); Goodman Lumber Co., 166 N.L.R.B. No. 48 (1967). Moreover, in his dis-
senting opinion, Member Zagoria, citing Piasecki Aircraft Corp., 123. N.L.R.B. 348, 
349-50 (1959), enforced, 280 F.2d 575 (3d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 933 (1961), 
pointed out that "[t]hough an employer may violate Section 8(a)(3) by refusing to 
hire particular employees, he does not normally violate Section 8(a)(5) by refusing 
to bargain about them, where they have not yet been made his employees." 177 
N.L.R.B. No. 114, at 25, 71 L.R.R.M. at 1441-42. Zagoria based that conclusion on 
the fact that "[t]he antidiscriminatory provisions refer to 'employee' generally, 
whereas, unlike those provisions, Section 8(a)(5) contains specific language requiring 
an employer to bargain for 'his employees'." Page Aircraft Maintenance, Inc., 123 
N.L.R.B. 159, 163 n.5 (1959), quoted in 177 N.L.R.B. No. 114, at 25, 71 L.R.R.M. at 1442. 
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measurably exceed the attachments of others who have been held 
to be employees."32 Hence, the Board concluded that "the Act's 
protection is not narrowly limited to those who are recorded on the 
employer's current payroll."33 The Board's conclusion is unsatis-
factory, however, since the traditional test for whether one is an 
employee for representation purposes has been whether there is a 
reasonable expectation of his being employed at a reasonable time 
in the future.34 Retirees, unlike the examples cited by the Board, 
simply do not fit this mold. 
The Board further noted that an employee's retirement is the 
time "when he is most vulnerable economically and most needs 
representation," and it determined that, therefore, protection should 
be afforded to retirees by treating them as "employees" under the 
NLRA for bargaining purposes, thereby guaranteeing them con-
tinued representation after their retirement from the active work 
force.35 But retirees are not without protection of their economic 
rights. Retirement benefits are recognized as vested rights, enforcible 
in the courts;36 and when they have been granted through an ef-
32. 177 N.L.R.B. No. 114, at 9, 71 L.R.R.M. at 1436. By its reasoning the Board 
rejected the interpretation of the trial examiner, who had distinguished this line 
of cases-that is, those holding others not presently working for the employer to be 
"employees"--on one of two grounds: either that there had been present in those 
cases circumstances in which there was a reasonable prospect that an employer-em-
ployee relationship was capable of being developed, or else that the persons in 
question in those cases were, unlike the retirees in Pittsburgh Plate Glass, members 
of the working class in general. TXD-196-67, at 6. 
33. 177 N.L.R.B No. 114, at 9, 71 L.R.R.M. at 1436. 
34. See note 29 supra. 
35. 177 N.L.R.B. No. 114, at 10, 71 L.R.R.M. at 1437. The Board supported its 
position by citing the language of the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 
Inc., 322 U.S. Ill, 129 (1944) (emphasis added): 
[T]he broad language of the Act's definitions, which in terms reject conventional 
limitations ••• leaves no doubt that its applicability is to be determined broadly, 
in doubtful situations, by underlying economic facts rather than technically and 
exclusively by previously established legal classifications .••• That term [em-
ployee] •.• must be understood with reference to the purpose of the Act and 
the facts involved in the economic relationship. "Where all the conditions of 
the relation require protection, protection ought to be given." 
36. In Weesner v. Electric Power Bd., 41 CCH Lab. Cas. 23,739, 23,741 (Tenn. 1961), 
it was recognized that 
[i]n the case of Bird v. Connecticut Power Co., et al., 144 Conn. 456, 133 A.2d 
894, the Court holds: "A Board of Directors cannot legally strip an employee 
of the benefits of a pension plan where the employee has complied with the terms 
of the offer of a pension since the purposes of the plan could be readily frustrated 
at the whim of the Directors. Forrish v. Kennedy, 377 Pa. 370, 376, 105 A.(2d) 671; 
Wilson v. Rudolph Wurlitzer Co., 48 Ohio App. 450, 454, 194 N.E. 441. 
In Cantor v. · Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 171 Ohio St. 405, 410, 171 N.E.2d 518, 522 
(1960), the court recognized that "once an employee, who has accepted employment 
under [a contract providing for a retirement plan], has complied with all the condi-
tions entitling him to participate in such plan, his rights become vested and the 
employer cannot divest the employee of his rights thereunder." Another court has 
also noted that a "pension plan is a unilateral contract which creates a vested right 
in those employees who accept the offer it contains by continuing in employment for 
the requisite number of years." Hurd v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 234 F.2d 942, 946 (7th 
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fective collective bargaining contract, they may be enforced in a 
suit under section 301 of the LMRA as well as in state courts.37 
Moreover, it is questionable whether retirees can expect to gain 
much protection by the representation of a union composed largely 
of active employees whose interests may be very different from 
theirs.38 
The Board also stated that 
[c]ompensation for employment need not be synchronous with the 
performance of labor. Current services may be rewarded by benefits 
which arise (or continue) in the future and past services may be re-
troactively compensated with additional benefits. . . . The critical 
question is whether the benefit is founded on employment-past or 
present.39 
The Board concluded that it was not inconsistent with the policies 
of the NLRA to require an employer to bargain about retirement 
benefits for "employees" who had performed their active employ-
ment during earlier time periods. 
It is not clear, however, that disposition of this question is so 
easy. If such benefits were extracted for services which were never 
provided, the union would be guilty of violating section 8(b)(6) 
of the NLRA, which makes it an unfair labor practice for a labor 
organization "to cause or attempt to cause an employer to pay or 
deliver or agree to pay or deliver any money or other thing of 
value . . . for services which are not performed or not to be per-
formed."40 There is some conceptual difficulty, at least, with view-
ing benefits extracted for services rendered in the past as "for services 
which are ... performed or . . . to be performed."41 Although it 
Cir. 1956). See Upholsterers' Union v. American Pad Co., 372 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 
1967); Carrozzoni v. Thomas, 56 CCH Lab. Cas. 19,908 (Pa. C.P. 1966). 
37. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1964); Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962). 
38. The Board had previously decided in Public Serv. Corp. of N.J., 72 N.L.R.B. 
224 (1947), that "even if pensioners were to be considered as employees • • • 
they lack a substantial community of interest with the employees who are presently 
in the active service of the Employers." 72 N.L.R.B. at 230. It might be argued that 
there is a third possibility for retirees, besides those of no representation or repre-
sentation by the union which represented them as active employees. That possibility 
is a separate union for retired employees. But even if retirees could qualify under 
the NLRA as employees, and even if the Board would certify retirees as an appro-
priate bargaining unit, it is unlikely that a union composed only of retirees could 
wield sufficient bargaining power to make it a viable force. 
39. 177 N.L.R.B. No. 114, at 9-10, 71 L.R.R.M. at 1436-37. 
40. 29 u.s.c. § 158(b)(6) (1964). 
41. The Board cited Bergen Point Iron Works, '19 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1947) (Leff, 
Trial Examiner), affd. by the Board, 79 N.L.R.B. 1073 (1948), in support of its 
position that past services may be retroactively compensated with additional bene-
fits. However, Bergen Point Iron Works involved a special set of circumstances 
which do not occur in the normal course of events. While the parties were negotiating 
for a new contract, they agreed to continue their prior contract in existence until the 
new one could be reached. It was stipulated by the parties that the new agreement, 
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should be acknowledged that section 8(b)(6) was aimed at another 
specific problem-namely, featherbedding42-it is arguable that 
forcing an employer to bargain about benefits for persons who have 
ceased to be and who will not again be in his employ, and who have 
been, or are continuing to be, compensated for their services accord-
ing to a previous agreement, falls within the spirit as well as the 
letter of this section. 
The Board finally relied on section 302(c)(5) of the LMRA,43 
which requires that employer contributions to joint labor-manage-
ment pension and health insurance plans be held in trusts, each of 
which must be administered by an equal number of employer and 
employee representatives. It felt that this provision was an indication 
of congressional intent that the labor-management relationship is 
to continue after active workers have retired.44 It should be noted, 
however, that section 302(c)(5) was really intended to provide a 
safeguard against the corrupt handling of retirement and health 
insurance trust funds, and that no policy regarding the relationship 
between employers and their retired workers was meant to be man-
ifested.45 
when reached, would be retroactively applied to the date of expiration of the old 
one. It was after this interim agreement that the employer refused to negotiate over 
the retroactive application of the new contract. Thus, although the trial e.xaminer's 
decision stated that such a refusal to bargain over retroactivity "was in itself a refusal 
to bargain upon a proper subject of negotiation" (79 N.L.R.B. at 1101), it is not 
clear that the same conclusion would be reached in the absence of a prior arrange-
ment between the parties under which the employees continue to work with the 
full expectation of receiving additional compensation at a later date. The employees 
of the Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company had no such expectation beyond those "de-
ferred wages" which had been expressly defined by the agreement under which they 
had been employed. It is possible to argue, then, that once they had finished working 
for their employer, they had been fully compensated for the work they had per-
formed, except for the specific amount of defined retirement benefits which they 
would receive in the future. Thus, any demands by them for additional compensation 
in the form of increased retirement benefits might be looked upon as a demand for 
payments for services not performed, since they had been, or would be, fully paid 
for all of their previous services. Under this interpretation, their demands would 
constitute a violation of § 8(b)(6) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(6) (1964). 
42. See 93 CONG. REc. 6446, 6859 (1947); American Newspaper Publishers Assn. v. 
NLRB, 345 U.S. 100, 102 (1953); Note, Featherbedding and Taft-Hartley, 52 CoLUM. 
L. REv. 1020, 1025-33 (1952). 
43. 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1964). 
44. The Board cited United States v. Ryan, 350 U.S. 299 (1956), in support of its 
argument, but that case dealt only with the narrow issue of who constitutes an em• 
ployee "representative" under § 302(b) of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 186(b) (1964). 
45. See United States v. Roth, 333 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 
942 (1965); Weir v. Chicago Plastering Institute, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 688 (N.D. Ind. 
1959), revd. and remanded on other grounds, 279 F.2d 92 (7th Cir. 1960); Sanders v. 
Birthright, 172 F. Supp. 895 (S.D. Ill. 1959); American Bakeries Co. v. Barrick, 162 
F. Supp. 882 (N.D. Ohio 1958), afjd., 285 F.2d 426 (6th Cir. 1960). See also Note, Taft-
Hartley Regulation of Employer Payments to Union Representatives: Bribery, Extor-
tion and Welfare Funds Under Section 302, 67 YALE L.J. 732 (1958). 
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In view of the fact that, as a matter of law, the Board's conclu-
sion was hardly inevitable, the benefits and protections likely to 
be gained by retirees as a result of the position assumed in Pittsburgh 
Plate Glass should be examined and compared with the problems 
which could arise from that position. At first, one is likely to believe 
that the Board's Pittsburgh Plate Glass holding will be highly bene-
ficial to the vast group of retired workers who, until that decision, 
were generally unrepresented. It must be recognized, however, that 
since retirees themselves possess no economic bargaining power, 
they must depend on their actively employed brethren to bring 
pressure to bear against their former employers for increases in re-
tirement benefits. It is improbable that active employees will be 
primarily interested in retirement benefits; rather, they are likely 
to be more concerned about increased wages, shorter hours, and 
greater fringe benefits. Moreover, since increased benefits for re-
tirees tend to make less money available for the benefits being sought 
by the active employees, it is difficult to imagine that the latter 
would be willing to exert much bargaining pressure on behalf of 
the retirees. 
Apparently, retirees are not to have even the slightest influence 
on the bargaining representative by being able to vote for or against 
a particular union. Although it seems incongruous for the Board 
to consider a retiree to be an "employee" within the meaning of 
the NLRA for collective bargaining purposes, while at the same 
time denying him the right to vote in the very election which de-
termines who his bargaining representative will be, that appears 
to be the conclus~on which the Board reached. Thus, while retirees 
do not have the right to vote, they are to have the right to be rep-
resented by the union which has been designated by the active 
employees as their bargaining representative.46 
The requirement that unions represent retirees could place a 
heavy burden on those unions. Even though one court has indicated 
that a medical insurance plan for active employees may provide 
better coverage than its counterpart does for retired workers, 47 such 
treatment might no longer be permissible. If a union allowed dis-
parate treatment of active employees and retirees to exist, it might 
be guilty of a breach of its statutory duty of fair representation.4s 
46. In most cases, however, due to the no-raiding agreements which most unions 
have today, the union representative is the very one which the retirees themselves 
had the right to choose while they were actively employed. 
47. Jensen v. Garvison, 274 F. Supp. 866, 869 (D. Ore. 1967). 
48. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). See also Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 
335 (1964); Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), 
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967); Hughes Tool Co., 147 N.L.R.B. 1573 (1964); Aaron, 
Some Aspects of the Union's Duty of Fair Representation, 22 OHIO ST. L.J. 39 (1961); 
Cox, The Duty of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. R.Ev. 151 (1957); Hanslowe, The 
Collective Agreement and the Duty of Fair Representation, 14 LAB. L.J. 1052 (1963). 
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That duty requires a union "to serve the interests of all members 
[of the designated bargaining unit] without hostility or discrimina-
tion toward any, to exercise its discretion with complete good faith 
and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct."49 Although this stan-
dard does not require a union to treat all persons identically, it does 
restrict its freedom of action. A union could easily find itself caught 
between the demands by active employees for all of the money 
which the employer has available for negotiated increases and the 
threat of suits by retirees for a breach of its fair representation duty 
if it fails to obtain increases in their benefits commensurate with 
those achieved for the active workers.50 The union would be placed 
in an equally precarious position if the employer decided to lock 
out its active employees in an effort to obtain a better collective 
bargaining position with respect to the demands for increased benefits 
for retirees.51 If it immediately acceded to the employer's demands, 
it might be in breach of its duty of fair representation from the 
standpoint of the retired workers. On the other hand, if it chose to 
continue pressing its demands for increased retirement benefits, 
union solidarity might well be endangered, since many active em-
ployees would not relish the prospect of a long lockout solely to 
accommodate the desires of the retirees. Such conflicting internal 
pressures could impair the union's general effectiveness as a bargain-
ing representative. 
These dangers, substantial in themselves, arise from the Board's 
position in Pittsburgh Plate Glass that "retired employees are 'em-
ployees' within the meaning of the statute [only] for the purposes 
of bargaining about changes in their retirement benefits . . . ."52 
New dimensions are added to the problem if retirees are eventually 
accorded full "employee" status. Although on its face the Board's 
reasoning did not extend that status under the Act to retirees, an 
analysis of the provisions of the NLRA suggests that such an ex-
tension is implicit in its conclusion. Section 2(3) states that "[t]he 
term 'employee' shall include any employee, and shall not be lim-
ited to the employees of a particular employer, unless the Act ex-
49. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967). 
50. While it is not entirely clear how much discretion a union may exercise in 
these instances, the mere threat of such suits would place the union in an unfortunate 
position. It might be afraid to seek large wage increases or increases in vacation 
allowances, in lieu of seeking increased retirement benefits, for fear that retirees 
might claim that they were not being adequately represented. On· the other hand, 
if the union obtained large retirement benefit increases in lieu of direct wage raises, 
the young, active employees might well harass it by raising the same type of complaint. 
51. That such a tactic is at least possible is demonstrated by American Ship 
Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965), and Darling&: Co., 171 N.L.R.B. No. 95, 
68 L.R.R.M. 1133 (1968). 
52. 177 N.L.R.B. No. 114, at 5, 71 L.R.R.M. at 1435. 
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plicitly states otherwise .... "53 Section 8(a)(5), dealing with an 
employer's obligation to bargain collectively, is narrower and ex-
pressly restricts the meaning of the term "employee" to the partic-
ular employer's own employees.54 While it is clear that all persons 
who would be considered "employees" under section 2(3) would 
not necessarily be considered "employees" within the narrower 
scope of section 8(a)(5), it does appear that any person regarded as 
an "employee" for bargaining purposes under section 8(a)(5) would 
automatically be covered by the broader section 2(3) definition.rm 
Similarly, those persons covered by -section 8(a)(5) appear to be 
covered by the term "employees" as used in section 9 of the Act,trn 
which regulates the selection of collective bargaining representatives. 
The reasoning of the Board that retirees can be employees solely 
for purposes of section 8(a)(5) is difficult to reconcile with the express 
terms of the Act, for it is clear that section 8(a)(5) merely places a 
restriction upon those otherwise considered to be "employees" 
within the scope of section 2(3).57 If this construction of the NLRA 
is sound, the eventual extension of full employee status to retirees 
is indicated; and, hence, Pittsburgh Plate Glass could affect both 
employers and unions even more significantly than has been an-
ticipated. 
The extension of full "employee" status under the NLRA to 
retired workers would constitute a great departure from existing 
Board precedent, especially in the area of voting eligibility.r;s As 
employees, retirees would be entitled to vote in representation elec-
tions and would also have the right to file decertification and deau-
thorization petitions.1i9 Thus, in those representation elections in 
which the active employees are fairly divided, it would be possible 
for a united group of pensioners to provide the controlling "swing" 
vote. Since retirees usually share little community of bargaining in-
terests with active employees, 60 such a result might well be destructive 
53. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1964) (emphasis added). 
54. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964); see note 4 supra. 
55. Cf. Page Aircraft Maintenance, Inc., 123 N.L.R.B. 159, 163 n.5 (1959). 
56. 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1964). This conclusion naturally follows from the fact that the 
only individuals with whom an employer is required to bargain by § 8(a)(5) arc the 
"representatives of his employees." Since § 9 defines the procedures to be followed in 
order to determine who those representatives will be, it is clear that the "employees" 
who may choose their representatives in accordance with § 9 procedures are the same 
"employees" with whose selected representatives the employer is required to bargain. 
57. See note 4 supra and text accompanying notes 53-54 supra. 
58. See note 29 supra. 
59. See NLRA §§ 9(c)(l)(A)(ii), (e)(l), 29 U.S.C. §§ 159(c)(l) (A) (ii), (c) (1) (1964). 
60. See the argument of the Board in Indianapolis Glove Co. v. NLRB, 400 F.2d 
363, 368 (6th Cir. 1968). 
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of the rights of the active workers involved. It is certainly doubtful 
that the Board contemplated such a result.6l-
Pittsburgh Plate Glass could also have important implications 
in those situations in which a union security agreement62 is in ef-
fect. If retirees are to be fully and fairly represented by the recog-
nized labor organization, 63 that union might equitably expect them 
to assume the obligation of providing financial support for the or-
ganization.6' It might be impossible as a practical matter, however, 
for the union to enforce a security agreement against a retiree. If 
an active employee refused to pay the required dues and fees, he 
would be subject to discharge;65 but a retiree is not vulnerable to 
that sanction. A similar result might be reached if the retiree's pen-
sion benefits were terminated; but since those benefit rights are 
generally recognized as being vested rights,66 termination of them 
would probably not withstand challenge in the courts. A possible 
sanction would be to take away the delinquent retiree's right to 
vote in representation elections. However, since the collective 
bargaining representative would already have been chosen, and 
since union no-raiding agreements tend to minimize interunion 
61. This conjecture as to the Board's attitude is well supported by the Board's 
express statement in Pittsburgh Plate Glass that it intended to continue its existing 
doctrine denying retirees the right to engage in representation proceedings. 177 
N.L.R.B. No. 114, at 7·8, 71 L.R.R.M. at 1436. 
62. Security agreements force employees, as a condition of employment, to comply 
with certain requirements which benefit the union. Since the closed shop was out-
lawed in 1947 by the Taft-Hartley amendments to §§ 7 and 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, 29 
U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(3) (1964), the union shop has become the most often employed 
security device. Union shop agreements, which require an employee to become a 
member of the union within a prescribed period after his initial employment, were 
found in about 53% of all collective bargaining contracts in 1964. Basic Contract Pat-
terns: Union Security Clauses, 56 L.R.R.M. 16 (1964). But the only "membership" 
obligation which may be required is, according to the NLRA, the duty to pay initia-
tion fees and dues. Union Starch &: Ref. Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 779 (1949), enforced, 186 
F.2d 1008 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 815 (1951). Other forms of union security 
devices are the agency shop, under which an employee need not join the union but 
must pay the union an amount equal to the customary initiation fee and the periodic 
dues required of members, and maintenance-of-membership agreements, which re-
quire that once an employee is a union member he must remain a member. 
63. For discussions of the duty of fair representation, see authorities cited in note 
48 supra. 
64. Congress has recognized the inequities which would result if a union could 
not require the sharing of its financial burden by all persons whom it is obligated to 
represent. The proviso to § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1964), which 
expressly permits the use of union security agreements, was promulgated by Congress 
in recognition of the fact that, in the absence of such agreements, "many employees 
sharing the benefits of what unions are able to accomplish, by collective bargaining, 
will refuse to pay their share of the cost." S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6 
(1947); 1 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE L.M.R.A. 412 (1948). 
65. See proviso to § 8(a)(3}, 29 U.S.C, § 158(a)(3) (1964). 
66. See note 36 supra. 
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representation competition, such a "penalty" would have little ef-
fect on the retiree. Thus, the burden of representing retirees would 
be imposed upon a union which could not effectively ensure that 
retirees would contribute their share to the organization's financial 
support.67 • 
Another problem which could arise in situations in which re-
tirees are allowed to become full union members or are required 
to do so68 is that as members they would be entitled to the wide 
range of privileges and protections guaranteed under the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (LMRDA).69 
67. This problem would be present even under the Board's position that retirees 
are "employees" only for bargaining purposes, for even in that case the union would 
have the right to expect financial support from the retired workers whom it must 
represent. 
68. These situations, however, are not the normal ones. Many unions have limited 
retirees to honorary, nonvoting membership status. 177 N.L.R.B. No. 144, at 24, 71 
L.R.R.M. at 1441. Nevertheless, if a union security agreement is in effect and it re• 
quires retirees to maintain their union membership, those retirees, presumably as 
"members," have the same obligations and rights as other employees. But if al-
lowing retirees to be voting members proved to be burdensome or problematic, 
the union might wish to expel them. It might be able to do so under the proviso 
to § 8(b)(l)(A) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § I59(b)(l)(A) (1964), even though it has 
a security agreement. It should be noted, however, that the expulsion of retirees 
might be challenged under § 102 of the Labor-Management Reporting and 
Disclosure Act (LMRDA), 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1964), or under state law as a viola• 
tion of a contract right or a property right in their union membership. See Polin 
v. Kaplin, 257 N.Y. 277, 177 N.E. 833 (1931); Heasley v. Operative Plasterers Intl. Assn., 
324 Pa. 257, 188 A. 206 (1936). In any event, if the union did expel retirees, it 
would thus have no way to enforce the payment of dues and fees by the retirees. 
In addition, the proviso to § 8(b)(l)(A) apparently allows a union to exclude retirees, 
even if they are "employees," in situations in which they are exempted from the 
security agreement or in which there is no security agreement. A union's right to 
exclude employees from membership on the basis of race was upheld in Oliphant v. 
Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 156 F. Supp. 89 (1957), afjd., 262 F.2d 359 
(6th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 935 (1959). Although racial discrimination by 
most unions was outlawed by § 703(c) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(c) (1964), the general principle of unrestricted union control over member• 
ship seems to persist. One recent development which might limit this doctrine is the 
growing recognition of a union's duty of fair representation for all members of the 
bargaining unit. See, e.g., Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). Arguably, this principle 
is incompatible with the idea that a union may arbitrarily exclude those for whom 
it is the exclusive bargaining representative; but this question is as yet unanswered. 
69. 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1964). These retirees would clearly be "members" within 
the meaning of that term as defined in § 3(o) of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 402(0) 
(1964). Among the rights which the LMRDA guarantees to the union members are the 
right to nominate candidates and to vote in union elections or referenda; freedom 
of expression on any business properly before a union meeting; the right to sue 
the union; and procedural safeguards in any disciplinary proceedings instituted against 
them. LMRDA § lOI(a), 29 U.S.C. § 4ll(a) (1964). For discussions concerning the 
particular rights guaranteed to individual union members under the LMRDA, see 
Aaron, The Union Member's "Bill of Rights": First Two Years, INousr. REL., Feb. 
1962, at 47; Dunau, Some Comments on the Bill of Rights of Members of Labor 
Organizations, in N.Y.U. 14TH CoNF. ON LAB. 77 (1961); Thatcher, Rights of In• 
dividual Union Members Under Title 1 and Section 610 of the Landrum-Griffin Act, 
52 GEO. L.J. 339 (1964). See generally Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and 
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Consequently, when the actively employed membership is closely 
divided on a particular internal union issue, a united group of re-
tired employees, who may share few interests with the active em-
ployees, might be able, as voting union members, to control the 
final resolution of the issue. 
Pittsburgh Plate Glass could also have important ramifications 
on other groups of individuals who are not currently employed in 
active capacities, especially if the ultimate effect of that decision 
is the imposition of full "employee" status on retirees. The question 
might arise, for example, whether permanently and totally disabled 
persons who are receiving compensation from their former employers 
above the amount to which they are entitled under workmen's 
compensation laws are "employees" within the meaning of the 
NLRA. They too have continuing ties with their former employ· 
ment units, even though they have no future expectation of being 
re-employed. Perhaps the Board's decision indicates that their dis-
ability benefits should also be considered mandatory subjects for 
collective bargaining. Another group of individuals who might 
qualify as "employees" under the Board's Pittsburgh Plate Glass 
reasoning consists of unemployed persons who have been laid off 
for long periods of time with no reasonable prospect of returning 
to work, but who are receiving supplemental unemployment bene-
fits (SUB) from their former employers. The Board's reasoning 
appears to require a union and an employer to negotiate over pos-
sible increases in these persons' SUB rates as well as in the length 
of time for which the benefits must be paid, although such individ.-
uals, like retirees, may have no reasonable prospects for re-employ-
ment in the near future. One might argue that this reasoning suggests 
that these persons should also be afforded coverage under the NLRA, 
but that conclusion would only magnify the problems which have 
been discussed with respect to the extension of such coverage to 
retired workers. Since pensioners, disabled persons, and unemployed 
workers usually have bargaining objectives and interests very dif-
ferent from those of active employees, bitter dissension among the 
various union factions is easily anticipated. Moreover, when the 
members of these various classes are aggregated, it is conceivable 
that in some situations they could constitute a substantial portion 
of the union membership with considerable influence in the union. 
It is clear, at least, that the inclusion of such "marginal employees" 
in the bargaining unit would not be conducive either to the effective 
representation which a labor organization is expected to provide 
Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 HARV. L. R.Ev. 851 (1960); Cox, Internal Affairs of Labor 
Unions Under the Labor Reform Act of 1959, 58 MICH. L. R.Ev. 819 (1960); Smith, 
The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 46 VA. L. R.Ev. 195 
(1960). 
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for its membership or to the stable labor relations which the NLRA 
was intended to foster.7° 
Some of the problems which have been discussed would not 
arise if the narrow position of the Board were maintained. In that 
event, retirees would be "employees" under the NLRA only for 
the purposes of being represented with respect to their retirement 
benefits. Despite the fact that this result appears to be inconsistent 
with the Act's provisions,71 it might be justified if it would afford 
either substantial benefits to retirees or significant protection of 
retirees' rights which are not already protected under the vested-
rights theory or by the section 301 suit.72 However, the benefits 
and protection which retirees would gain under Pittsburgh Plate 
Glass are, at best, minimal. Retirees have very little economic power 
on their side, and this impotence would place them at a distinct 
collective bargaining disadvantage vis-a-vis their former employer. 
Since many of their objectives are in direct conflict with those of the 
active employees, one might argue that their situation would be even 
worse. Indeed, without the right to full "employee" and "member-
ship" status under the NLRA and LMRDA, retirees would be at 
the mercy of the very persons with whom they compete for the avail-
able monies of their employer. On the other hand, if full "employee" 
and "membership" status were accorded to retired workers, the 
situation might well be reversed, with a divided group of active 
employees being "controlled" by a united group of pensioners. At 
the least, there is the danger that full employee status for retirees 
might produce considerable internal union dissension, which would 
reduce the union's effectiveness in representing all persons in the 
bargaining unit. 
Even if retired workers were to be covered by the Act, a union 
would not really be able to prevent an employer from making uni-
lateral changes in their retirement plans. Once a bargaining impasse 
is reached on an issue, the employer would be free to implement 
its proposed modification, so long as it did so in good faith and 
with valid economic justification.73 Since active employees are un-
70. See Labor Management Relations Act § l(b), 29 U.S.C. § 14I(b) (1964). 
71. See text accompanying notes 52-57 supra. 
72. With respect to the vested-rights theory, see note 36 supra and accompanying 
text. With respect to the § 301 suit, see text accompanying notes 26, 37 supra. 
73. See NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962); NLRB v. U.S. Sonics Corp., 312 F.2d 610 
(1st Cir. 1963); Pacific Gamble Robinson Co. v. NLRB, 186 F.2d 106 (6th Cir. 1950). See 
also Cox, The Duty To Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV, L. REv. 1401 (1958); Com• 
ment, Impasse in Collective Bargaining, 44 TEXAS L. REv. 769 (1966). This reasoning, 
of course, assumes that the impasse was reached in "good faith"; otherwise, the em-
ployer would be guilty of violating § 8(a)(5) of the NLRA, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1964). 
See Industrial Union of Marine &: Shipbuilding Workers v. NLRB, 320 F.2d 615 (3d 
Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 984 (1964). See also Bowman, An Employer's Unilateral 
.dction-An Unfair Labor Practice?, 9 VAND. L. REv. 487 (1956); Lang, Unilateral 
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likely to exert economic pressure in order to protect retirees, the
latter would be forced to resort to the same legal remedies which
have always been available to them for the protection of their vested
rights. 74
Thus it appears that the exclusion of retirees from the coverage
of the NLRA would not deprive them of meaningful protection, for
even under the Act they would enjoy very little.7 5 When the prob-
lems of supporting the Board's position in Pittsburgh Plate Glass,
and the potential problems of giving it effect, are balanced against
the minimal benefits, the wisdom of including retirees within the
coverage of the NLRA appears to be doubtful. In Pittsburgh Plate
Glass itself, the Board's finding of an unfair labor practice should
be sustained only on the ground of the employer's unilateral mod-
ification of an effective collective bargaining agreement. 6
Changes by Management as a Violation of the Duty To Bargain Collectively, 9 Sw.
L.J. 276 (1955).
74. See notes 36-37 supra and accompanying text.
75. Of course, employers and unions would still be free to engage in "permissive"
collective bargaining on the subject of retirees' benefits. As Member Zagoria noted,
"[m]any unions and companies, recognizing their mutual interest in retiree benefits,
have voluntarily worked out arrangements to improve past pensioners' rights and
benefits .... [That is] a tribute to the humanistic quality of an enlightened labor-
management relationship . .. ." 177 N.L.R.B. No. 114, at 27, 71 L.R.R.M. at 1442.
76. See notes 15-16 supra and accompanying text.
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